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ADDRESS
SNAPSHOTS FROM THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, 1966-2007
HON. DIANE P. WOOD*
The Fairchild Lecture
University of Wisconsin Law School
Apil 27, 2007
Good afternoon. It is an enormous honor and pleasure-albeit a
somewhat bittersweet one-to be here with you today to deliver the
nineteenth Thomas E. Fairchild Lecture. I had hoped very much that
the extraordinary and distinguished man for whom this lecture is named
would be with us, one more time, this year, but unfortunately that was
not to be. Nonetheless, for anyone even remotely associated with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, it will be a very
long time before it will be possible to think of the court without
thinking at the same time of Judge Fairchild. The court opened its
doors on June 16, 1891,' almost 116 years ago. Judge Fairchild's
official commission was dated August 11, 1966.2 He served and
contributed actively to the court's work literally up until the date of his
death on February 14, 2007-that is, for a period spanning almost
forty-one years. Put differently, for more than one-third of the time that
the Seventh Circuit has been in existence, Judge Fairchild was part of
it.
Judge Fairchild began his service on the court at a time when the
federal courts as an institution were experiencing dramatic change. His
colleague and mine, Judge Richard A. Posner, has suggested that the
year 1960 was "a turning point in the history of the federal judiciary." 3
Perhaps that is when the ship began to turn, for reasons we can discuss.
But the shift to the system we know today was still in its early stages in
1966, when Judge Fairchild left the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and
joined his colleagues in Chicago. For that reason, the story of Judge
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and
Senior Lecturer in Law at The University of Chicago Law School.
1. See RAYMAN L. SOLOMON, HISTORY OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 1891-1941,
at 23 (Bicentennial Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States 1981).
2. See id. at 177.
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 8
(1996).
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Fairchild's career on the Seventh Circuit is, in many ways, a
microcosm of the modem story of the federal judiciary as a whole. I
therefore begin by reviewing some of the broader changes that have
occurred in the federal courts from 1966 to the present. Because it
would be impossible to review all of Judge Fairchild's many
contributions to that process, I then focus on some representative years
in his tenure, beginning with the judge's first year or so on the court,
and then proceeding roughly by decades up until the present time.
Because Judge Fairchild, by then in his nineties, had reduced his
caseload down to a small fraction of that of an active judge by the
midpoint of the 2000s, I complete the tour of the Seventh Circuit's
experience with a brief glance at my own published opinions from the
year 2006.
The changes are indeed dramatic. In a small way they may help to
explain why the process of choosing and confirming judges was not as
contentious in the mid-1960s as it is today; why even less attention was
paid to the courts of appeals than is the case now; and how the job of
being a federal judge has changed, in some ways for the better and in
some for the worse.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN GENERAL
Those who have followed the annual reports on the judiciary
prepared by the Chief Justice of the United States know that federal
judges today believe themselves to be overworked and underpaid. Both
of those perceptions are contestable, of course, but it is helpful to look
behind them and see what empirical data may support or refute them.
The first and easiest measure of workload is the number of cases
commenced and terminated in each year. In 1960, for the entire
country, that number was 3,899.' Total terminations were somewhat
less-3,713-of which about 1,000 were procedural terminations and
about 2,700 were terminations on the merits.5 By 1966, the numbers
were already swelling: there were 7,183 cases commenced and 6,571
terminated, of which 4,087 were terminations on the merits.6 Jumping
ahead to 2005, however (the latest year for which complete statistics
were available from the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts), at the national level there were 68,473 filings (excluding those
for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); the
Seventh Circuit alone had 3,789, slightly fewer than the entire nation
4. Id. at 72-73 tbl.3.6.
5. See id.
6. Id.
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did in 1960. 7 The termination number is equally large: 61,975 cases
terminated nationally, 3,706 in the Seventh Circuit.8
Who has been doing all of that work? If you said, "The judges,"
you would be only partly right. Although the absolute number of
federal judges (the only ones I am discussing here) has increased since
1960, or 1966, the number of judges as a percentage of the total
workforce of the Judicial Branch has shrunk. In 1965, the Judiciary
employed 6,461 people,9 of whom 393, or 6.1 percent, were Article III
judges (that is, district-court judges and court-of-appeals judges-the
data exclude the Supreme Court and what has become the Federal
Circuit).1" In 2005, the total workforce of the Judicial Branch had
mushroomed to 34,045, but the total number of Article III judges
(including senior judges and assuming no vacancies) had expanded only
a little more than threefold, to about 1,350 (4 percent of the total)."
Each circuit judge in 1960 was entitled to one law clerk; in 1970 the
number went up to two, and in 1980 the number reached three, where
it remains today for an active circuit judge. (Because circuit judges are
also entitled to both a judicial assistant and a secretary, some judges
choose to use the secretarial slot for a fourth law clerk. Other judges
also have volunteer externs who perform roughly the same function as
law clerks.) At the court-of-appeals level, there is no equivalent to the
magistrate judges who have become essential to the district courts for
the processing of their cases. In the field of bankruptcy, however, a
new institution called Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, composed of
Article I bankruptcy judges appointed by the circuit council, was
created in 1984 to relieve the courts of appeals of certain bankruptcy
appeals.12
7. Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2005, at tbl.B, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/contents. html.
8. Id.
9. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1965, at 92 (1966).
10. Administrative Office of the Courts, Authorized Judgeships, http://
www.uscourts.gov/history/allauthorizedjudgeships.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2008);
see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 44 (2000) (circuit courts), 133 (district courts), 211 (Customs
and Patent Appeals), and 251 (International Trade). The list of authorized judgeships
erroneously lists Court of Claims judges as Article III, see 28 U.S.C. § 171 (defining
them as Article I), and correctly places Puerto Rico's judges as Article III rather than
Article I, see 28 U.S.C. § 199. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 373, 1332 (treating Puerto Rico
differently than territorial courts).
11. Telephone interview by Grace Moriarty with Karen M. Hanchett,
Administrative Office of the Courts (Apr. 27, 2007).
12. See Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 336 (1984); 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1).
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The nature of the work has also changed greatly. Two examples
will suffice to make the point: actions under federal civil-rights
legislation and habeas corpus petitions from state and federal
prisoners. 3 While one could find some cases in the early 1960s that
arguably fit within these categories, they were few and far between.
Part of the first group, employment discrimination, is almost entirely a
creature of statutes that began with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 4 and continued through later laws prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of age and disability. 5 For almost a century,
the law that was originally known as the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20,
187116 lay almost dormant. Then, in 1961 the Supreme Court decided
Monroe v. Pape,7 which held that the statute-by then codified as 42
U.S.C. § 1983-was meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of
constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities by a governmental
official's abuse of his position.' 8 Professors Fallon, Meltzer, and
Shapiro, now the authors of Hart & Wechsler' s Federal Courts and the
Federal System, 9 note that "[p]rior to Monroe, litigation under § 1983
was infrequent; one commentator reports that there were only 19 cases
in the U.S.C.A. annotations under § 1983 in its first 65 years." 20 The
number of cases initiated in the district courts, and thus also appeals,
ballooned in later years. The Hart & Wechsler authors report that in
1961 only 296 civil rights cases were filed, according to the records
kept by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO).21 In
contrast, the most recent Director's Report, which gives data for the
year ending September 30, 2005, shows a total of 36,096 private civil-
rights cases filed and another 16,005 prisoner civil-rights petitions, for
a total of about 52,000 cases.22 (Not all of these cases were filed under
section 1983. The AO's data does not give this detail; the trend,
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (general federal habeas corpus); id. § 2254
(authorizing petitions from state prisoners); id. § 2255 (authorizing collateral relief for
federal prisoners' challenges to the fact of conviction or duration of confinement).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
15. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
34; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
16. 42 Cong. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000)).
17. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
18. Id. at 171.
19. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART & WECHSLER'S: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2003).
20. Id. at 1081.
21. Id. at 1082.
22. Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2005, supra note 7, at tbl.C-
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however, is unmistakable.) The numbers for the courts of appeals
follow this pattern. I was not able to find the number of civil-rights
appeals for 1961, but if there were only 296 district-court cases
nationally, the number of appeals must have been very low. Today, if
one adds up civil-rights cases in which the United States is the
defendant-including employment cases, prisoner cases, and "other"
cases-and other civil-rights cases where a state or a private party is the
defendant, the grand total reflected in the 2005 Director's Report is
12,051 appeals.23
The picture is similar for habeas corpus, despite a number of
efforts on the part of the Supreme Court and Congress to rein in the
number of petitions that state and federal prisoners file. (Habeas corpus
petitions filed by persons whose custody is not the result of a criminal
conviction pose significantly different problems. The data do not
distinguish among cases on this basis, but one can say generally that
many of the procedural devices designed to deter filings by convicted
prisoners do not apply to the latter group.) Until the Supreme Court
decided Brown v. Allen in 1953,24 it was not clear whether a federal
court considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a state
prisoner was entitled to reexamine the merits of federal constitutional
claims that the state courts had considered. The Court there held that
the answer was yes and thereby laid the groundwork for a vast increase
in the habeas corpus business of the federal courts.25 Later legislative
developments have changed the rule in Brown but, interestingly, have
not stemmed the tide of petitions, at least to the degree the drafters
might have wished.
The other case that gave the green light for these claims was Fay
v. Noia,26 which took a very forgiving view-later rejected in
legislation-toward so-called procedural default.27 Only claims where
the petitioner had "deliberately by-passed" a state procedural
mechanism were foreclosed, the Court held.28 Pay apparently had an
immediate impact on prisoner filings at the district-court level: in 1960
there were only 871 petitions nationally, but by 1965 the number had
jumped to 4,845.29 Combining motions to vacate sentence, general
habeas corpus, and death-penalty habeas corpus petitions, the
23. See Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2005, supra note 7, at
tbl.B-1A.
24. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
25. Id. at 485-87.
26. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 438.
29. See FALLON, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 19, at 1312.
2008:1
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corresponding number for 2005 was 35,234.30 The courts of appeals
had almost 4,000 appeals from habeas corpus cases in 2004;3' in 2005
the number jumped to 6,362,32 but that surge was probably attributable
in part to the effect of the Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v.
New Jerseyj3 and United States v. Booker,3 4 which, taken together,
suggested that prisoners might be able to reduce their sentences
significantly. (That hope was dashed when the courts decided that
neither decision could be applied retroactively on collateral review,35
but it took some time for the effect of the latter rulings to be felt.) The
point, whether or not the numbers subside again, is clear. For both
civil-rights cases and habeas corpus petitions, the business of the
federal courts changed dramatically over the years of Judge Fairchild's
service.
Perhaps all of this growth would have been absorbed easily if the
number of judges had grown proportionally to the caseload. (Perhaps it
would not have; the ability of any group to interact collegially and
efficiently will suffer as it grows larger, and an ever-greater number of
courts or judges would make it more difficult to maintain uniformity of
the law.) But the number of judges did not grow proportionally. In
1965, there were 407 Article III judgeships in the United States,
including the nine on the Supreme Court.36 By 2006, there were 875
Article III judgeships, including eleven temporary slots. 3 7 The total
number of judges serving is higher than that, thanks to the dedicated
service of senior judges like Judge Fairchild. But even with the
approximately 450 senior judges who donate some or all of their time
to the judiciary, it is easy to see that the number of judges has grown
much more slowly than the number of cases.
The only responsible reaction to this kind of squeeze is to become
more efficient. The alternative is ever-lengthening queues of cases
awaiting decision, which is a result that no one wants. Indeed, to the
extent that litigants wish to avoid these queues, they are opting out of
the judicial system altogether and turning to arbitration and mediation.
30. Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2005, supra note 7, at tbl.C-
2A.
31. Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2004, at tbl.B-IA, available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/contents.html.
32. Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2005, supra note 7, at tbl.B-
IA.
33. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
34. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
35. See, e.g., McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir.
2005).
36. Administrative Office of the Courts, supra note 10.
37. Id.
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The demand for court services nevertheless remains high. For that
reason, procedures have changed as courts search for ways to cope with
their heavy caseloads.
Many of the steps courts have taken to maximize the contributions
of their judicial personnel are familiar. When Judge Fairchild first sat
on the Seventh Circuit, oral argument was a given, even for pro se
appellants. Today, even though the Seventh Circuit is among the more
generous in the country with argument and in principle hears argument
in every fully counseled case, that still leaves more than a third of the
docket to the strictly written procedures allowed by Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34. In the Seventh Circuit, a panel of three judges,
assisted by the staff attorneys, convenes in chambers or in a conference
room to discuss the nonargued "Rule 34" cases and decide what to do
with each one. The cases are typically resolved with a nonprecedential
order, rather than a full published opinion. When Judge Fairchild
joined the court there was no such animal as an unpublished or
nonprecedential disposition. Although they were not formally made part
of the Seventh Circuit's set of options until the late 1970s, as early as
1973 the court was beginning to experiment with this device.38
The larger number of law clerks, both in chambers and in central
staff attorneys' offices, has helped the judges manage their growing
workload, as have developments in technology that make it possible to
do more and better research in the same amount of time and to work at
locations far from the courthouse. I sometimes wonder what it was like
back in the mid-1960s, as I wade through the piles of briefs that never
seem to get smaller. We can all get a glimpse of that if we now turn to
what Judge Fairchild was actually doing during the representative
periods of time that I have selected.
II. JUDGE FAIRCHILD ON THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
A. In the Beginning: 1966-67
Judge Fairchild's commission was signed by President Lyndon B.
Johnson on August 11, 1966. He took the oath of office on August 24
and immediately took up his duties on the court. 39 The first opinion that
I was able to find that he authored was an appeal in a case called Green
v. Commissioner4 from a decision of the United States Tax Court. In
that opinion, the court ruled that certain transfers of corporate stock to
38. Interview with Collins Fitzpatrick, Circuit Executive to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Chicago, Il. (Apr. 24, 2007).
39. SOLOMON, supra note 1, at 177.
40. 367 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1966).
2008:1
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an attorney yielded money that was properly characterized as interest
income, not a capital gain.4 Interestingly, Judge Fairchild was not the
junior judge on the panel. The person with that spot was Judge Walter
Cummings, whose commission was also dated August 11, 1966 but
who was a few years younger than Judge Fairchild and thus "junior" to
him as a result of the court's use of birthdays as a tie-breaking device
for determining order of seniority.42 The opinion is not particularly
notable: this was no Chicago Seven case, for which the Judge later
rightly became famous. Instead, it is a concise, workmanlike treatment
of a straightforward tax issue, wrapped up in less than two pages. In
the end, the case was resolved with the use of two principles that are
still as familiar and as important today as they were then: first, that a
court must look at "the substance rather than the form of a transaction"
in order to determine its tax consequences, and, second, that factual
decisions of a lower court should not be overturned unless they were
43clearly erroneous.
In all, between Green, which was released on October 21, 1966,
and the end of 1967, Judge Fairchild authored twenty-eight signed
opinions. Of that group, an astonishing 29 percent-eight opinions-
were in diversity cases, that is, suits between citizens of different states
in which the governing law was state law rather than federal law.'
These must have seemed quite familiar to him since he had just spent
nine years on the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Another seven cases
were criminal appeals." Four opinions dealt with patent law'-an area
41. Id. at 824-25.
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2000).
43. Green, 367 F.2d at 825.
44. The statute authorizing diversity jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Fleck
Bros. Co. v. Sullivan, 385 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1967); Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore
Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967); Doyle v. Nels Johnson Constr. Co., 382
F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1967); Spurr v. LaSalle Constr. Co., 385 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1967);
Dorim v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 382 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1967); Jacobson v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 381 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1967); Jonaitis v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 374 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1967); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v.
Hires Bottling Co. of Chi., 371 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1967).
45. United States v. Dichiarinte, 385 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1967) (involved
heroin); United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1967) (involved Hobbs Act
and extortion); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967) (involved
mailing threatening letters); Ware v. United States, 376 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1967)
(motion to vacate sentence); United States v. Dillard, 376 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1967)
(involved heroin); United States v. England, 376 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1967) (involved a
criminal tax offense); United States v. Bitter, 374 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1967) (involved
mail fraud).
46. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat7 Gypsum Co., 387 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1967);
Gass v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 387 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1967); Cloud v. Standard
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the Judge singled out as one of his favorites in the Oral History he
prepared with Collins Fitzpatrick, the Circuit Executive of the Seventh
Circuit.47 (Congress removed patent cases from the jurisdiction of the
regional courts of appeals in 1982 when it assigned exclusive
jurisdiction for this class of cases to the Federal Circuit.48 But that was
far in the future when Judge Fairchild came to the court.) Two cases
each came from the National Labor Relations Board,49 the Tax Court,5°
and prisoner complaints5 and one each from the fields of antitrust,52
securities regulation,53 and Social Security benefits.54 Particularly when
one keeps in mind the fact that in 1966 there was no such thing as the
unpublished or nonprecedential order and that Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34 had not yet been amended to permit courts to
dispense with oral argument, the difference between Judge Fairchild's
first year and the present is striking. (Indeed, in 1967 the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Procedure was worrying about whether thirty
minutes a side was too stringent a limitation for oral argument-it
thought not, as long as courts were willing freely to grant additional
time.) 55
Time does not permit a close look at all of these opinions, but a
few comments about each group are warranted. Throughout every
subject matter, one consistent theme is that parties are entitled to a full
hearing and that jury verdicts should not be overturned lightly. For
example, in Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Hires Bottling Company,56 the
Judge's opinion reversed a district-court decision dismissing a
complaint by a buyer of goods who pleaded fraudulent
misrepresentation and remanded the case for further proceedings.57
Packaging Corp., 376 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1967); Williams v. V. R. Myers Pump &
Supply, Inc., 371 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1966).
47. Interview by Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Circuit Executive, with Thomas E.
Fairchild, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
Madison, Wis. (Sept. 15, 1992).
48. See28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
49. NLRB v. Clark Products, Inc., 385 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1967); Macomb
Pottery Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1967).
50. Klarkowski v. Comm'r, 385 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1967); Green v. Comm'r,
367 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1966).
51. The two prisoner cases were issued on the same day. Cooper v. Pate, 382
F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967); Jackson v. Pate, 382 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1967).
52. Nichols v. Spencer Intl Press, Lnc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967).
53. SEC v. Inv. Corp. of Am., 369 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1966).
54. Hopkins v. Gardner, 374 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1967).
55. See FED. R. App. P. 34 (advisory committee's notes from the 1967
adoption).
56. 371 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1967).
57. Id. at 257, 259.
2008:1
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Similarly, in Fleck Bros. Co. v. Sullivan,58 the court gave the plaintiff a
second chance in a libel case that the district court had rejected, sending
it back for further proceedings." Three other cases upheld jury verdicts
for plaintiffs: Doyle v. Nels Johnson Construction Co. (personal injury
at the place of employment), 6° Spurr v. LaSalle Construction Co.
(personal injury at the place of employment) 61 and Dorin v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the United States (a defamation action).62
One, Jonaitis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,63 upheld a jury
verdict for a defendant in a case charging assault and battery in
connection with the repossession of the plaintiff's station wagon. 64 In
the last two cases, however, the Judge wrote for panels that upheld
verdicts in favor of defendants: in one, Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore
Drive Corp. ,65 the question was whether a co-op apartment's board of
directors had acted arbitrarily in rejecting a tenant's request to sublet,66
and in the other, Jacobson v. Equitable Life Assurance Co. of the
United States,67 the question was whether an insurance company
correctly refused to pay on two life-insurance policies. 68 The Judge's
opinions tend to be short and to the point-in fact, they are a joy to
read, compared with the tomes that I and my colleagues sometimes
produce today.
There is nothing alien about the law that was being discussed in
1966 and 1967 in the diversity cases. Quite the opposite is true when
we turn to the criminal decisions. For one thing, the sheer number is
very low-seven, if one counts a collateral attack on a sentence as
criminal, as opposed to what we would now call a federal habeas
corpus case, or briefly a "2255. '69 To put it mildly, no judge presently
sitting on the Seventh Circuit, or any other court of appeals for that
matter, could honestly claim to have had only one habeas case over the
last year. Both of the drug cases involved heroin-one charged the
unlawful importation of heroin70 and the other charged the violation of
58. 385 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. 1967).
59. Id.
60. 382 F.2d 735, 736-37, 739 (7th Cir. 1967).
61. 385 F.2d 322, 325, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1967).
62. 382 F.2d 73, 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1967).
63. 374 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1967).
64. Id. at 868-69.
65. 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967).
66. Id. at 136, 138.
67. 381 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1967).
68. Id. at 956, 961.
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). The case is Ware v. United States, 376
F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1967).
70. United States v. Dichiarinte, 385 F.2d 333, 334 (7th Cir. 1967).
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the statute prohibiting the sale or distribution of narcotic drugs except
in the original stamped package.7" Not a single cocaine case! Not a
single case about methamphetamine! Nothing about marijuana!
Yet there were still, notwithstanding those glaring omissions, some
common threads. One of the drug cases, United States v. Dillard,"2
posed the familiar questions whether the defendant's association with
others was enough to sweep him into the criminal conduct and whether
he had constructive possession of the drugs. 73 Those are garden-variety
issues today. In the other, United States v. Dichiarinte,74 Judge
Fairchild, writing for the court, rejected a trial court's instruction to the
jury telling them that "every witness is presumed to speak the truth, but
this presumption may be outweighed by [various factors]. 75 There was
also a mail-fraud case in which Judge Fairchild, over Judge
Schnackenberg's dissent, upheld the defendant's conviction in the face
of a claim that his trial was unfair because the marshal kept him in
custody throughout the trial.76 A criminal-extortion case, brought under
the Hobbs Act, 77 and a criminal-tax prosecution7 ' both resulted in
convictions that the court of appeals affirmed.
Lastly, Judge Fairchild wrote an opinion for the en banc court that
was published exactly a year after he took the oath of office. The case
was United States v. Shapiro,79 and the question that occasioned the
convening of the en banc court had to do with the proper formulation of
the insanity defense in a federal criminal prosecution (in the particular
case, a prosecution for mailing threatening letters) .80 After a scholarly
discussion of the evolution of the insanity defense, Judge Fairchild
turned to the proposed official draft of the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code. This should not have surprised anyone who knew
him well. The Judge was a lifelong member of the ALI and served with
distinction for many years on its Council. (This is another point in
common that I share with him; I have been privileged to sit on the
ALI's Council since 2003.) The full court decided to adopt the ALI's
definition, which had the following advantages that Judge Fairchild
identified: First, instead of talking about a person's "perverted and
deranged condition," it referred to "mental disease or defect." Second,
71. United States v. Dillard, 376 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 1967).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Dichiarinte, 385 F.2d at 333.
75. Id. at 339.
76. United States v. Bitter, 374 F.2d 744, 745, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1967).
77. United States v. Prarmo, 385 F.2d 387, 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1967).
78. United States v. England, 376 F.2d 381, 382, 384 (7th Cir. 1967).
79. 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967).
80. Id. at 681, 684.
2008:1
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instead of saying "incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong,
or incapable of knowing the nature of the act," it spoke of "one who
'lacks substantial capacity . to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct."' And third, rather than looking for the
"complete destr[uction]" of the person's will, the ALI definition
referred to "one who 'lacks substantial capacity . . . to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.' ' 81 The case was obviously
controversial within the court. Nine judges sat on the en banc court;
four wrote separately, objecting in various ways to the adoption of the
Model Penal Code definition.
There is little that needs to be said about the Judge's four patent
cases aside from the fact that they exist at all. Each one falls squarely
within the area of jurisdiction that is now reserved for the Federal
Circuit: Was the patent valid? Was it infringed? If validity was
challenged, the court had to decide whether the subject matter was
6482 ote
"obvious"-a topic that dominated three of the four cases. The other
case dealt with the obscure patent doctrine of "file wrapper estoppel,"
under which a patentee who changed the scope of its claims during the
process of obtaining the patent is prevented from now claiming that the
patent covers material that it abandoned.83
The remaining cases include two Labor Board matters in which the
court enforced Board orders under the National Labor Relations Act;84
two appeals from decisions of the Tax Court,85 in both of which the
court was affirmed; the two prisoner cases, both dealing with aspects of
a prisoner's right to exercise his religion in prison (a very familiar topic
to today's judges);86 and the miscellaneous federal claims mentioned
earlier.87 The securities case yielded an opinion solely on matters of
federal procedure; the court found that it lacked appellate jurisdiction
81. Id. at 684-85.
82. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Natl Gypsum Co., 387 F.2d 799, 801-02 (7th Cir.
1967); Gass v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 387 F.2d 129, 132 (7th Cir. 1967); Cloud v.
Standard Packaging Corp., 376 F.2d 384, 390-91 (7th Cir. 1967).
83. Williams v. V. R. Myers Pump and Supply, Inc., 371 F.2d 192, 195 (7th
Cir. 1966).
84. NLRB v. Clark Prods., Inc., 385 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1967); Macomb
Pottery Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1967).
85. Klarkowski v. Conm'r, 385 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1967); Green v. Comm'r,
367 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1966).
86. Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967); Jackson v. Pate, 382 F.2d
517 (7th Cir. 1967).
87. Hopkins v. Gardner, 374 F.2d 726, 727 (7th Cir. 1967) (Social Security
benefits); Nichols v. Spencer Intl Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967) (antitrust);
SEC v. Inv. Corp. of Am., 369 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1966) (securities).
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because the order appealed from merely interpreted a preliminary
injunction; it did not grant, deny, or modify one.88
All in all, the cases that Judge Fairchild authored during his first
year or so on the court paint a picture of an institution with a far-
different menu of cases and a much lighter workload. Even so, it is
doubtful that the judges were sitting around wondering what to do with
their spare time. It is a rare case even now on which one could not
spend a little more time, and these judges, with only one law clerk
apiece, were operating with much less assistance than judges now
receive. Things were changing rapidly, however. As of the mid-1960s,
President Johnson's Great Society programs were multiplying, the civil-
rights revolution was in full swing, environmental legislation was
creating new rights and expectations, and courts were recognizing
private rights of action at a fast clip. By the mid-1970s, we can see
those changes reflected at the Seventh Circuit.
B. Chief Judge: 1976
On February 7, 1975, Judge Fairchild became Chief Judge of the
Circuit, succeeding Judge Luther M. Swygert. 9 A search for the
opinions he authored during the next calendar year, 1976, turns up
nineteen of them. The mix had changed dramatically over the course of
the Judge's first decade of service. By this time, cases dealing with
employment discrimination and the civil rights of state employees had
moved into the leading place, numerically speaking, for Chief Judge
Fairchild, who wrote five opinions that year in this area. 90 The Judge
wrote two opinions each in the areas of criminal law, 9' diversity, 92
prisoners' rights, 93 and intellectual property (one patent case and one
88. Inv. Corp. of Am., 369 F.2d at 384.
89. Joan H. Lefkow, Thomas E. Fairchild A Judge's Legacy, 2007 Wis. L.
Rv. 1, 22.
90. Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976);
Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1976); Malone v. Delco Battery-Muncie,
540 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1976); Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976); United
States v. City of Chicago, 534 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1976).
91. United States v. Jacobs, 543 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Auler, 539 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1976).
92. Hebel v. Ebersole, 543 F.2d 14, 15 (7th Cir. 1976), was brought under
the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000). It dealt with the rights of
competing claimants to proceeds of cattle sold at an auction. Id. at 15. DeSantis v.
Parker Feeders, Inc., 547 F.2d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1976), was a personal injury action
in which the minor plaintiff claimed that he was injured by a defective machine.
93. Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976); Moeck v. Zajackowski,
541 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1976).
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copyright case).94 The remainder of the cases came from a wide variety
of areas: one habeas corpus petition,95 a petition for enforcement of an
order of the NLRB,96 one appeal from an adverse decision on Social
Security benefits, 97 an appeal from a district-court order reducing an
allowance for bankruptcy legal fees, 98 an appeal from an order
permitting the Commodity Exchange Authority to pursue an
administrative proceeding, 99 and, finally, a decision allowing the
Federal Trade Commission to continue with an investigation and
postponing ruling on any possible res judicata defense until after the
Commission issued a complaint."' 0
There is a hint in one of these opinions-Belasick v. Dannen,'o' the
bankruptcy case-that the court was already starting to think about
which opinions should be published and which did not deserve such
broad circulation. At the end of the opinion, Judge Fairchild added the
following note: "We have cast this decision as a published opinion for
future guidance in the Northern District of Illinois, and because some
past opinions of this court have been silent as to the procedural issues
associated with automatic review of attorneys' fees in bankruptcy
cases." 
102
Otherwise, the only remarkable thing about the cases from this
period is the low number. In the single habeas corpus petition that came
before Judge Fairchild, the panel voted to reverse and remand a
decision denying issuance of the writ without an evidentiary hearing.
The prisoner had, in the panel's view, come forward with enough
evidence to warrant a hearing on his Sixth Amendment claim.
Numbers, or lack thereof, is also the notable point about the Social
Security appeal. Today, to the extent there is a lawyer involved (and
there usually is), those appeals usually show up on the Seventh
Circuit's "short-argument day" calendars. Translated, that means that
the advocates are limited to ten minutes per side to present their case,
and the decision usually appears as an order, meaning that it is
published only in the computer databases and on the court's Web site
and is regarded as nonprecedential.
94. IM. Tool Works, Inc. v. Foster Grant Co., 547 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1976)
(patent); Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 536 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976) (copyright).
95. Hudson v. Cannon, 529 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1976).
96. Sundstrand Heat T7ransfer, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1976).
97. Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1976).
98. Belasick v. Dannen, 542 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1976).
99. Frey v. Commodity Exch. Auth., 547 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1976).
100. FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1976).
101. Belasick, 542 F.2d at 41.
102. Id. at 43.
HeinOnline  -- 2008 Wis. L. Rev.  14 2008
2008:1 Snapshots from the Seventh Circuit 15
In the copyright case, °3 Judge Fairchild's panel affirmed a
decision by then-district judge Joel M. Flaum (later to serve as one of
Judge Fairchild's successors as chief judge and still today an active
judge on the court). In the course of explaining why the panel had
concluded that the copyright in question had been forfeited, Judge
Fairchild alluded to and applied the "new" Federal Rules of
Evidence.' ° The patent case 10 5 is notable for its length-it ran fifteen
pages in the Federal Reporter. Substantively, the opinion reflected a
typically careful resolution: the court ruled that the plaintiff's patents
were valid and infringed, but it denied the plaintiff's request for the
added benefit of treble damages and attorneys' fees.'06
The prisoner cases look much like the ones that still make their
way to the Seventh Circuit. (That may or may not be a positive
comment; people who view glasses as half empty may think that it
means that society has not made much progress in this area.) In one, a
class of pretrial detainees in Cook County alleged that they were
subjected to constitutionally inadequate facilities for recreation,
exercise, and reading; that they should not have been deprived of
visiting privileges with family and friends; and that they should be
permitted to earn money for bond and defense purposes.'07 The district
court had thrown these claims out, but the court of appeals reversed.' 8
Judge Fairchild emphasized the fact that pretrial detainees were in a
different position than people serving a prison sentence after
conviction. 1°9 "Strictly speaking," he wrote, "pre-trial detainees may
not be punished at all because they have been convicted of no crime.
The sole permissible interest of the state is to ensure their presence at
trial."" ° Holding that "as a matter of due process, pre-trial detainees
may suffer no more restrictions than are reasonably necessary to ensure
their presence at trial," the court sent the case back for further
proceedings."' The other case involving prisoners' rights raised the
question whether a state-prison warden was entitled to issue an order
that effectively prevented a prisoner in his custody from attending the
trial in a civil suit the prisoner had brought against a guard at the
prison. "' In this instance, the district court had enjoined the warden
103. Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 536 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976).
104. Id. at 167.
105. 111. Tool Works, Inc. v. Foster Grant Co., 547 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1976).
106. Id. at 1302, 1314.
107. Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976).
108. Id. at 999.
109. Id. at 999-1000.
110. Id. at 999.
111. Id. at 999, 1001.
112. Moeck v. Zajackowskl, 541 F.2d 177, 178, 180, 182 (7th Cir. 1976).
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from enforcing his order, but the court of appeals reversed. 1 3 On one
hand, Judge Fairchild wrote, courts should give appropriate weight to
the state's interest in safe administration of the prisons." 4 On the other
hand, it appeared that the state here was giving more favorable
treatment to prisoners whose civil actions were in state court than to
their federal-court counterparts.' " ' No rational basis supported that
distinction." 6 For that reason and others, the court reversed the district
court's decision and remanded for reconsideration of the question
whether the prisoner's presence in his federal civil trial was
"reasonably necessary."1 7
Only one of the diversity cases looks like the group Judge
Fairchild had decided a decade earlier. It was a personal-injury suit
brought by a minor and his father against the manufacturer of a cattle-
feeder machine, which had injured the boy when he became entrapped
in it." '8 The court affirmed a jury verdict in the boy's favor."9 The
other case in which substantive rights depended on state law took
advantage of a federal procedural device called interpleader. This
provides a way in which everyone who has a claim to a certain fund
may litigate at the same time; it assures the stakeholder that it will not
have to pay (or even fight about paying) multiple damages. This
particular decision sorted out the rights of competing claimants to the
proceeds of a cattle auction. 2°
The last two areas are criminal law and employment
discrimination. One of the criminal cases involved wire fraud,' 2' and
the other involved the crime of making false declarations before a grand
jury that was investigating possible Hobbs Act violations.' 22 (Again,
where are the drug cases?) The employment cases also have a familiar
look in everything but numbers. In one case, Malone v. Delco Battery-
Muncie,'2 3 the plaintiff complained that his employer should have
reinstated him; the court rejected his position as inconsistent with his
pension plan.'24 Other cases involved complaints about employment
113. Id. at 182.
114. Id. at 180.
115. Id. at 181.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 182.
118. DeSantis v. Parker Feeders, Inc., 547 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1976).
119. Id. at 360, 367.
120. Hebel v. Ebersole, 543 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1976).
121. United States v. Auler, 539 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1976).
122. United States v. Jacobs, 543 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1976).
123. 540 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1976).
124. Id. at 298.
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discrimination in the Chicago police department, 25 complaints that the
Governor of Illinois had violated due process when he discharged some
state employees without adequate process,1 26  charges of racial
discrimination in hiring for Milwaukee jobs, 127 and claims that were
dismissed of two broad-ranging civil-rights conspiracies-one relating
to a high school's firing of a tenured teacher who had criticized the
school's dress code and its policies regarding the hiring of minority
faculty 28 and the other relating to an effort to unionize a hospital in
Chicago. 129 By the mid-1970s, in short, the court was beginning to have
a docket more like the one we have today.
C. Senior Status Begins: 1986
On August 31, 1981, when he was sixty-eight years old and
statutorily entitled to do so, 3° Judge Fairchild took senior status and
passed the reins of the chief judgeship to his colleague Walter J.
Cummings. As the 1980s went on, his caseload was reduced somewhat.
Still, the accumulated record for 1986 shows a judge at the top of his
game, entrusted with some of the most important opinions that had to
be written. That year, he authored opinions in four criminal cases,131
four diversity cases, 132 one habeas corpus matter, 133 one Title VII case
involving religious discrimination, 134 and one case involving the duty to
arbitrate various issues under a collective-bargaining agreement. 135
Of this group, the case that stands out is the Judge's lengthy
opinion in United States v. Kimberlin,1 36 which runs forty-four pages in
125. United States v. City of Chicago, 534 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1976).
126. Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1976).
127. Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976).
128. See Murphy v. Mount Cannel High School, 543 F.2d 1189, 1190 (7th
Cir. 1976).
129. Seeid. at 1191.
130. See28 U.S.C. § 371(c) (2000).
131. United States v. Chiattello, 804 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Strawser, 800 F.2d 704 (7th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Pendegraph, 791 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1986).
132. Am. Ins. Corp. v. Sederes, 807 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1986); Gavcus v.
Potts, 808 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1986); Concrete Structures of the Midwest, Inc. v.
Fireman's Ins. Co., 790 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1986); Young v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
790 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1986).
133. United States ex rel. Reese v. Fainan, 801 F.2d 275, 276 (7th Cir.
1986).
134. Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986).
135. Torrington Co. v. Local Union 590, 803 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1986).
136. 805 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
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the Federal Reporter. 137 It presented a cornucopia of criminal-procedure
issues. Included among them were the following: (1) the validity of
admitting the testimony of six witnesses who had been hypnotized
during the government's investigation of certain bombings in Indiana, 138
(2) jury issues concerning voir dire and sequestration,' (3) the
defendant's right to a speedy trial,'" (4) the use of an allegedly
suggestive photographic array for identification,' 4' (5) various Fourth
Amendment issues in connection with searches, 4 2 (6) permissible
procedures after a mistrial was declared, 143 (7) evidentiary issues, '44 and
(8) alleged perjury of a governmental witness. 145 After a painstakingly
careful examination of countless claims of error, the court concluded in
the end that Kimberlin's conviction had to be affirmed. 146 Judge
Richard D. Cudahy wrote a brief concurring opinion in which he
stressed how close some of the calls were, but, he wrote, "Although
these and a number of other problems are very troubling, I think the
majority has addressed them conscientiously and in a fashion that
sustains the result. ,147
Of the other criminal cases, two involved drug prosecutions, 48 one
a bank robbery,1 49 and one an appeal from a denial of habeas corpus.'
In United States v. Strawser,1' the focus of the opinion was not on the
underlying conviction for dealing in marijuana; it was instead on the
district court's order that the attorney who had represented the
defendant had to disgorge the excessive portion of the fee that he had
collected. '52 As the Judge pointed out in affirming the order, the case
implicated not only the proper discipline for allegedly unethical conduct
but also the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to competent
representation.' 53 The other drug case (again arising from a marijuana
137. Id.
138. Id. at 216-23.
139. Id. at 223-24.
140. Id. at 224-27.
141. Id. at 227-28.
142. Id. at 228-30.
143. Id. at 230-31.
144. Id. at 231-43.
145. Id. at 246-47.
146. Id. at 254.
147. Id. at 254, 256 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
148. See United States v. Strawser, 800 F.2d 704, 705 (7th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Chiattello, 804 F.2d 415, 417 (7th Cir. 1986).
149. See United States v. Pendegraph, 791 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1986).
150. See United States ex rel. Reese v. Fairman, 801 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1986).
151. 800 F.2d at 704.
152. See id. at 704-05.
153. Id. at 708.
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business) grappled with a claim of double jeopardy and an attack on the
sufficiency of the indictment.1 14 The bank-robbery case presented
recurring issues of constitutional criminal procedure, including the
admissibility of a nontestifying defendant's confession and the
application of the harmless-error rule. 155 Finally, in the habeas corpus
case, Judge Fairchild authored a panel opinion holding that a county's
creation of a recidivist court did not violate the petitioner's right to due
process, nor did the petitioner suffer unconstitutional prejudice from a
newspaper story. 156
On the civil side of the docket, the Judge handled one state-law
tort action for trespass in which the court affirmed an award of nominal
damages, 5 7 one insurance dispute involving both agency questions and
issues of the insurer's right to rescind a policy, 5 ' and a subcontractor's
untimely effort to recover on a public-works bond.159 A final diversity
case took the form of a shareholder's derivative suit in which the
plaintiffs were trying to challenge a company's adoption of a "poison-
pill" antitakeover plan.16 Relying largely on procedural grounds,
including a finding that the directors were not "doing business" in
Illinois for purposes of personal jurisdiction,' that the alleged tort
occurred in New York, 162 and that the action could not proceed in the
absence of any defendant director, 163 Judge Fairchild affirmed the
district court's decision dismissing the action.' 64 In his Title VII case,
the Judge affirmed a judgment for Loyola University of Chicago, which
had decided to reserve the next three vacancies in its philosophy
department for Jesuits. 165 The plaintiff had been employed in the
department as a part-time lecturer, but, because he was Jewish, he was
not eligible to be hired for any of the open slots. 166 The panel majority,
for whom Judge Fairchild wrote, found that being a Jesuit was a "bona
154. See United States v. Chiattello, 804 F.2d 415, 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1986).
155. See United States v. Pendegraph, 791 F.2d 1462, 1463-65 (11th Cir.
1986).
156. See United States ex rel. Reese v. Fairman, 801 F.2d 275, 276-77 (7th
Cir. 1986).
157. Gavcus v. Potts, 808 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1986).
158. Am. Ins. Corp. v. Sederes, 807 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1986).
159. Concrete Structures of the Midwest, Inc. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 790 F.2d
41 (7th Cir. 1986).
160. Young v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 790 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1986).
161. Id. at 569.
162. Id. at 570.
163. Id. at 572.
164. Id. at 574.
165. Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986).
166. Id. at 353.
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fide occupational qualification," 16 7 and thus that the plaintiffs claim of
religious discrimination had to be rejected.' 68 Judge Posner concurred
on the narrower ground that the plaintiff was excluded, not because he
was Jewish, but because he was not Jesuit, a status he shared with
many Christians and members of other religions.'69 In Judge Posner's
view, this fact demonstrated that he had not been deprived of an
employment opportunity because of his religion.170 The last civil case
involved the arbitrability of a claim that had arisen under a collective-
bargaining agreement between an employer and a union.' 7' Through
Judge Fairchild's opinion, the panel upheld the district court's decision
in favor of arbitrability.172
D. Continuing Service to the Court- 1994
Perhaps this is a good point at which to recall the fact that senior
Article III judges serve essentially for free. The reason for this is
rooted in the fact that Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution says,
"The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office."' 73 Briefly put, this means that federal
judges have the right, though not the obligation, to remain in office
until they are carried out feet first, and if they do so, their pay cannot
be diminished (at least in nominal dollars). In a system where there are
no "sticks" available to persuade someone to step down from a
position, the only things left are "carrots." The carrot that Congress
has provided to make senior status or retirement attractive for federal
judges (either one of which creates a vacancy for the incumbent
President to fill) is continued salary protection: if the judge takes senior
status and continues to perform work for the court, he or she continues
to be paid exactly the same amount as the active judges, including any
raises that might come along. 174 If the judge retires and does no judicial
work, he or she still receives 100 percent of the salary that applied at
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000) (recognizing a "bona fide
occupational qualification" defense to a claim of religious, sex, or national-origin
discrimination).
168. Pime, 803 F.2d at 354.
169. Id. (Posner, J., concurring).
170. See id. at 354-55.
171. Torrington Co. v. Local Union 590, 803 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1986).
172. Id.
173. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
174. See28 U.S.C. § 371(b)(1) (2000).
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the date of retirement. 175 So, in that sense, the people of the United
States were privileged to have Judge Fairchild serve essentially for free
for more than twenty-five years, from 1981 until his death earlier this
year.
My representative year for the mid-1990s is 1994, when the Judge
authored four opinions in cases dealing with different issues of federal
civil law, 7 6 five habeas corpus opinions,177 two criminal matters,'78 and
two diversity cases.' 79 In terms of balance, this is a docket that looks
familiar to today's judge. Once again, Judge Fairchild was assigned to
write the lead opinion for the en banc court in one of the civil cases,
United States v. Hynes.'80 The question before the court was whether
Cook County was entitled to collect general property taxes on property
that the United States was in the process of purchasing through
installment payments."' Had the United States already owned the
property, the answer would have been no."' But a majority of the full
court decided that the tax was permissible and that Illinois was not
unconstitutionally discriminating against the federal government even
though it did not impose similar taxes on the property of state and local
governments.183 The key point was whether the government in question
permitted the taxation.'84 Because the federal government did, Cook
County was free to impose and collect the tax. 85
The habeas corpus decisions all dealt with the question whether an
error in instructing the jury on murder and voluntary manslaughter
could be (and was) harmless. 186 The court grouped together five such
cases, all of which were assigned to Judge Fairchild to write. 187 In the
175. See id. § 371(b)(2).
176. Peabody Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, US.
Dep't of Labor, 40 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 1994); Becker v. IRS, 34 F.3d 398 (7th Cir.
1994); United States v. Hynes, 20 F.3d 1437 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Richardson v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 17 F.3d 213 (7th Cir. 1994).
177. See Green v. Peters, 36 F.3d 602 (7th Cir. 1994); Carter v. DeTella, 36
F.3d 1385 (7th Cir. 1994); Cuevas v. Washington, 36 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 1994); Rosa
v. Peters, 36 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 1994); Everette v. Roth, 37 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 1994).
178. See United States v. Nelson, 29 F.3d 261 (7th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Huebner, 16 F.3d 348 (9th Cir. 1994).
179. See Jones v. Coleman Co., 39 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 1994); Michael .
Neuman & Assocs. v. Florabelle Flowers, Inc., 15 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 1994).
180. 20 F.3d 1437 (7th Cir. 1994).
181. Id. at 1438-39.
182. See id. at 1439.
183. Id. at 1441.
184. See id. at 1443.
185. See id.
186. See supra note 177.
187. See supra note 177.
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opinions, the Judge carefully worked through the developing Supreme
Court jurisprudence on habeas corpus-easily one of the most complex
areas of federal law even then (and it has only gotten worse)-and
analyzed whether an instructional error should be characterized as a
"trial error" subject to the harmless-error rule or if it is "structural
error" that is so fundamental that the only way to correct it is to start
over again.'88 He concluded that it was trial error-a conclusion that has
been vindicated by later Supreme Court decisions. 189
In the area of criminal law, we see the Sentencing Guidelines make
an appearance in one of the Judge's opinions, United States v.
Nelson. 9° The Guidelines had taken effect in 1987, and so by 1994
courts were becoming accustomed to working their way through the
myriad issues that defendants can raise under them. The other case,
United States v. Huebner,'9' arose in the Ninth Circuit, illustrating the
fact that Judge Fairchild sat from time to time with other courts around
the country. The question in the case was whether the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy for the purpose of causing an IRS levy on the
filer's wages to be lifted could amount to a criminal violation of the tax
laws.'92 Judge Fairchild thought that it was not attempted tax evasion,193
over the dissent of another judge who saw the plaintiffs as tax
protesters who were deliberately abusing the system.' 94 The Judge
explained that the bankruptcy filings "produced delay, but would not
defeat, or result in escape from, the tax."' 95 On the other hand, the
majority concluded that the taxpayers' convictions for conspiracy to
defraud the United States had to be upheld.'96 The care and precision
with which he drew the distinctions here were typical of his work, up
until the very end.
EPILOGUE
Judge Fairchild continued to participate actively in the court's
work until literally days before he passed away. In the last couple of
years, he chose to limit himself to the court's Rule 34 docket, which (as
I mentioned earlier) applies to cases in which at least one party is pro se
188. See supra note 177.
189. See supra note 177.
190. 29 F.3d 261 (7th Cir. 1994).
191. 16 F.3d 348 (9th Cir. 1994).
192. Id. at 350.
193. Id. at 351.
194. See id. at 354-55.
195. Id. at 351-52.
196. Id. at 354.
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and thus that the court designates for decision without oral argument.
The number of filings, the balance of cases, and the diversity of the
docket continued to grow throughout that time, and I personally can
attest to the fact that Judge Fairchild kept up with these developments
as well as anyone on the court.
For purposes of completing the story of the court's evolution over
the period of Judge Fairchild's service, I took a look at the cases in
which I was the authoring judge during the calendar year 2006.
Criminal appeals, immigration cases, civil-rights cases, habeas corpus
petitions, and diversity cases were all roughly equal in number-in
each, I had authored five to seven published opinions. Other areas in
which I had published opinions included securities law, the Truth in
Lending Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (employment
discrimination), administrative law, bankruptcy, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act. This list illustrates an important fact about the
change in the work of the courts of appeals since the mid-1960s: much
of our work now arises under federal statutes that Congress has passed
over this period of time. From time to time, the judiciary asks Congress
to take into account the impact that new legislation is likely to have on
the courts when it considers creating new federal crimes, new federal
administrative regimes, or new federal rights of action. Sometimes
these pleas are heeded; sometimes they seem not to be.
What has remained constant over the years is the challenge and
privilege of serving on a court like the Seventh Circuit. Those of us
who were fortunate enough to work with Judge Fairchild, as I was for
more than eleven years, had a stellar example to follow. We all miss
his deep commitment to justice, his empathy for the parties before the
court, his scrupulous attention to the governing law, and his cheerful
companionship with his colleagues. This lecture meant a great deal to
him, and I thank the Fairchild clerks and the University of Wisconsin
for inviting me to deliver it this year. It is, without a doubt, the best
way for all of us to carry on Judge Fairchild's legacy.
2008:1
HeinOnline  -- 2008 Wis. L. Rev.  23 2008
* * *
HeinOnline  -- 2008 Wis. L. Rev.  24 2008
